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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
In 1969 Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA or Act)1 in an effort to deal with the many environmental problems facing the United States. 2 In the three years that
the Act has been in force, a large number of suits has been filed
by environmental organizations seeking to enforce the standards
enunciated in NEPA. The courts hearing these cases generally
agree that NEPA imposes only procedural3 duties on administrative agencies. 4 This implies that the courts will merely determine whether the agency in question has complied with the procedural requirements contained in Section 1025 of the Act.6 This

further implies that the courts will not review this same agency's
final decision to undertake, or not to undertake, a given project
7
even if the project may have a severe environmental impact.
In an attempt to determine whether this approach fulfills the
142 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
For the legislative history of the Act, see 115 CONG. REC. 19008-13 (1969) (Senate
passage); id. at 26569-91 (House passage); id. at 29046-65; id. at 29066-89 (Senate
comparison of environmental quality measures); id. at 39701-04 (Conference Report); id.
at 40415-27 (Senate agreement to Conference Report); id. at 40923-28 (House agreement
to Conference Report); H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. REP.
No. 91-765, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969).
3 For the purposes of this article, the term "procedural" will be used to denote the duties
imposed upon the agencies by NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The term
"substantive" will be used in the context of the argument that NEPA should require
agencies actually to incorporate and apply the information accumulated in the impact
in the decision-making process.
statements
4
See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971), in which the court said
that once the precepts of NEPA have been followed, a good faith judgment by the
administering agency as to the consequences leaves the court no further role to play.
542 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
6 See, e.g., Committee For Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
7See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971); but see Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 4 E.R.C. 1721, 1726 (8th Cir. 1972).
2
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policies stated in the Act, this article examines the recent trends
facilitating judicial review of an agency's actions, discusses the
developing judicial construction of N EPA, and seeks to determine
whether the courts' refusal to give substantive meaning to NEPA
has undermined the Act.
I. TERMS OF THE ACT

The purposes of NEPA, as stated in Section 2 of the Act, are
(1) to "declare a national policy" encouraging "productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment"; (2) to
promote efforts to prevent damage to the environment; (3) to
educate man about natural resources; and (4) to establish the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).8 In an attempt to insure that these goals are realized, Congress in the remainder of
the Act developed a two-fold scheme. The first part of this
scheme entailed the establishment of broad policies of environmental protection,? and the second involved the creation of procedural duties which must be satisfied by federal agencies in order
to insure that those agencies are accounting for environmental
concerns.1 0
The policies established by Congress in Section 10111 are very
broad. The Act itself states,
[l]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in
cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable
means and measures.., in a manner calculated to foster
and... maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations of
2
Americans.'
Furthermore, the federal government has the "continuing responsibility... to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions,
programs, and resources" so that the nation "may" accomplish
the goals listed in Section 101.13
842 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
9
Id. § 4331.
'1Old. § 4332.
11Id. § 433 1.
12 Id. § 433 ](a).
13 Those goals are to:
(I) fulfill the responsibilities for each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations:
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The extent to which federal agencies must adopt these policies
is not clear. Section 103 required all federal agencies to review
"their present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and
current policies and.procedures" to determine "whether there are
any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full
compliance with the purposes" of NEPA. 14 That section further
required that all federal agencies "shall propose to the President
not later than July 1, 197 1" those measures needed "to bring their
authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes,
and procedures ...

in this [Act]."' 15 This apparently strong direc-

tive may be weakened considerably by Section 105, however,
which claims that the "policies and goals set forth in this [Act] are
supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of
16
Federal agencies."
Realizing that a mere statement of policy coupled with a few
vague directives would not necessarily insure environmental protection,' 7 Congress included in Section 102 of NEPA several
"action forcing" procedures."' The purpose behind these procedures was explained in a report written by the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs which argued,
[I]f goals and principles are to be effective, they must be
capable of being applied in action. [The Act] thus incorporates certain "action forcing" provisions and procedures
which are designed to assure that all Federal agencies plan
and work toward meeting the challenge of a better environment. 19

(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
Id. §§ 433 I(b)(l)-(6).
14 Id. § 4333.
'5 Id.

Id. § 4335.
"See 115 CONG. REC. 19010- l1 (1969).
18 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). The "action forcing" procedures are embodied in the
Act's requirements that agencies prepare environmental impact statements.
19115 CONG. REC. 19010- 11 (1969).
16
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In general, NEPA requires that, "to the fullest extent possible," 20 "all"

21

federal agencies must follow certain duties listed

in Section 102.22 These duties include (1) the duty to use a
"systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking"; 23 (2) the
duty to "identify and develop methods and procedures... which
will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities
and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking", 4 and (3) the duty to prepare impact statements under
certain conditions. 5
The last duty listed-the duty to file an impact state26
ment-generally has been the focus of controversy in the courts.
Under Subsection 102(2)(C), a federal agency must prepare "detailed" statements discussing the environmental impact of, and the
alternatives to, proposed agency actions whenever those actions
are "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 2 7 Two major problems with this requirement are readily apparent: it is unclear (1) under what circumstances must the agency file an impact statement, and (2) if such a
statement must be filed, what information must be included in it.
The Act provides little assistance in answering these questions.
In attempting to determine when an impact statement must be
prepared by a federal agency, several key words in Subsection
102(2)(C)28 must be examined. Those words include "major,"
2042 U.S.C. §4332 (1970).

In 1971, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) promulgated Guidelines for
Federal Agencies Under the National Environmental Policy Act to assist the agencies in
interpreting the provisions of the Act. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as
Guidelines]. The Guidelines stated that the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" is meant
to require compliance with Subsection 102(2)(C) unless "existing law applicable to the
agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes compliance impossible." Id. § 4. This
interpretation was also expressed in the legislative history. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC.
39703 (1969) (Conference Report); id. at 40418 (statement of Senator Jackson).
2142 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970).
The guidelines construed this term to exempt the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) from the requirement of preparing impact statements for environmentally protective

regulatory acts which it concurs in or takes by itself. This construction is discussed in
Kalur v. Resor, Water Quality and NEPA's Application to EPA, 2 E.L.R. 10025, 10029.
2242 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(A)-(H) (1970).
23Id. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
24 Id. § 4332(2)(B).
2 Id. § 4332(2)(C).
See notes 69-96 and accompanying text infra. There have been nearly one hundred
district and appellate court decisions involving NEPA. The number of lawsuits brought
under NEPA now numbers over two hundred. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
26

ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY: THIRD ANNUAL REPORT

CEQ THIRD ANNUAL REPORT].

2742 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1970).
28
id.

249 (1972)

[hereinafter cited as
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"Federal," "actions," "significantly," and "affecting." None of
these words is defined in the Act. The Guidelines for Federal
Agencies Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Guidelines),2 9 promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality in
1971, have filled this void somewhat by defining the words "actions" 30 and "significantly, ' 31 and by discussing the overall meaning of the phrase "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. " 32 An important fact to note is
that the word "significant" has been defined to include actions
with both beneficial and detrimental effects on the environment,
even if the agency believes the overall effect of the proposed
action will be beneficial. 33
The answer to the second problem-that of determining what
the impact statement must contain and the sufficiency of the
discussion therein-lies both in the language of the Act 3 4 and in
the construction afforded to the word "detailed." 3 5 Although the
Guidelines do not define "detailed," they do elaborate on the
Subsection 102(2)(C) requirements that the impact statement in36
clude discussions of environmental impacts of the proposal,
37
unavoidable adverse impacts of the proposal, alternatives to the
proposed action,a the relationship between local short-term uses
of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, 3 9 and irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would follow from the implementation of the proposed action. 40
29 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971).

30

SeeGuidelines, supra note 20, §§ 5(a)(i)-(iii). "Actions" include: recommendations or
favorable reports relating to legislation; projects and continuing activities directly undertaken by federal agencies, supported through federal funds or involving federal entitlements for use; and policy, regulations and procedure making.
31 See Guidelines, supra note 20, § 5(c). The Guidelines refer the agencies to § 101 (b) of
NEPA (see note 13 supra) for the broad range of aspects that must be surveyed in an
assessment of significant effect.
32 See Guidelines, supra note 20, § 5(b). The clause is to be construed with a view to the
overall, cumulative impact of the proposed action, and of further contemplated actions.
Actions with "highly controversial" environmental impacts are to be covered by statements in all cases.
3 See Guidelines, supra note 20, § 5(c).
34 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1970).
35 See note 85-96 and accompanying text infra.
36 Guidelines, supra note 20, § 6(a)(i) (must include information and technical data
adequate to permit a careful assessment of environmental impact by commenting
agencies); id. § 6(a)(ii) (include primary and secondary significant consequences).
37 Id. § 6(a)(iii) (include any consequences adverse to the environmental goals of
NEPA § 101(b) ).
38 Id. § 6(a)(iv) (a rigorous exploration and objective evaluation of alternatives is essential).
39 Id. § 6(a)(v) (assessment of cumulative and long-term effects from the perspective that
each generation is the trustee of the environment for succeeding generations is required).
40 Id. § 6(a)(vi) (must identify the extent to which the action curtails the range of
beneficial uses of the environment).
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Once drafted, these impact statements must be made available
to the President, the CEQ, and the public. 41 Furthermore, these

statements "shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes." 42 It is not clear whether this last requirement is satisfied by the statement's mere presence alongside
the proposal or whether the word "accompany" means more than
the mere passing of papers along the bureaucratic decision-making
route. 43 The answer to this question hinges to a large degree on
how much weight federal agencies must give to the policies outlined in the Act. If the agencies do not have to incorporate the
policies of NEPA into their decision-making processes, then formal compliance with the impact statement requirements should be
enough to insure that the agency has complied with the terms of
NEPA. That is to say, the agency would have to compile a
"detailed" statement but it would not have to consider it. If,
however, the policies underlying NEPA must be incorporated
directly into the decision-making process, then it can be argued
that the word "accompany" must mean more than mere physical
proximity.
II. THE COURT'S ROLE
Congressional enactments such as NEPA, even combined with
interpretive guidelines promulgated by an agency charged with
overseeing the policies of the Act, do not necessarily insure
44
bureaucratic compliance with the letter and spirit of the law.
The modern trend toward liberal construction of the standing
4
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5
41 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
42 id.
43The Guidelines intimate that the latter should be the case. See Guidelines, supra note

20, § 6(a)(iv) (sufficient analysis of alternatives should accompany the proposed action
through the review process in order not to foreclose options with lesser detrimental
effects); id. § 10(b) (statements should be furnished to the Council early enough in the
review process to permit meaningful consideration of the environmental issues involved).
See notes 101-26 and accompanying text infra.
44 At least two courts have berated the agencies for failing to comply with N EPA. See
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189

(D.D.C. 1972). The CEQ has stated that there is data which implies that agencies are not
taking sufficient care to define those actions which require impact statements and are not
properly preparing those impact statements which are deemed to be required. This situation raises the question "not whether the goals of NEPA are being implemented
effectively but whether they are being implemented at all." CEQ THIRD ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 26, at 247. In addition, the General Accounting Office has recently released a
report stating that the agency impact statements were inadequate in the following respects:

discussion of and support for the identified environmental impacts; treatment of reviewing
agencies' comments; and consideration of alternatives and their impacts. 3 ENv. RPTR.
910.
455 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
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has made it possible for an increasing variety of groups and
individuals to challenge agency action for failure to meet NEPA's
requirements. Indeed, it has been said that "[clitizen enforcement
of NEPA through court action has been one of the main forces in
46
making the Act's intended reforms a reality."
The Administrative Procedure Act entitles a "person suffering
legal wrong" because of agency action, or "adversely affected or
aggrieved" by agency action, "within the meaning of a relevant
statute," to obtain judicial review of that action. 4 7 While a detailed
discussion of standing is beyond the scope of this article, it is
appropriate to indicate the important cases which have made the
current standing requirements as liberal as they are and which
suggest future developments in the law of standing under the
APA.
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp,4 8 a case dealing with standing under the APA, the Supreme Court reversed lower court holdings that had denied the
plaintiffs standing on the basis of their lack of a "legal interest." 49
The Court advanced, as the test for standing, the requirements
that the challenged action cause the plaintiff "injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and that the interest sought to be protected
be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute ....
"50 Although the Court did not define
"injury in fact," it stated that the injury could be "economic or
otherwise" and that the interest sought to be protected could
51
reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values.
The Data Processingcase was a significant advancement of the
trend, which the majority opinion noted, 5 2 toward enlargement of
the class of people who may protest administrative action. 53 While
the Court also noted the existence of a drive for enlarging the
category of aggrieved "persons" within the meaning of the
4CEQ THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 248.
475 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
48397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).

49Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D.
Minn. 1968), aff d, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
50397 U.S. at 152, 153.

Industrial plaintiffs have also used NEPA to challenge agency action detrimental to
their interests. On the question of standing of these plaintiffs, see CEQ THIRD ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 26, at 254-55.

51397 U.S. at 154, citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). For application of this standard
by the lower courts, see, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal
Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
52 397 U.S. at 154.
53

See also Davis, Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970); Jaffe,

Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 6:491

APA, 54 the problem remains as to who or what may be included
in the class of aggrieved "persons" under the test of Data Processing.
Decisions in federal courts of appeals have recognized that
environmental groups can challenge agency action under the
APA. 55 These decisions have encouraged additional suits by environmental groups seeking to assert their organizational interests in
protecting the environment. The Supreme Court, however, in
Sierra Club v. Morton,56 has erected an obstacle in the path of
this liberalizing trend in environmental law. The Court of Appeals
57
for the Ninth Circuit had denied standing to the Sierra Club,
which had sought an injunction to prevent development of a
commercial ski resort in the Sequoia National Forest. The Club
had filed suit as a membership organization having a "special
interest" in national park and forest conservation, and this was
rejected as a basis for standing? 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of standing in a 4-3
decision. The Court stated that although an organization whose
members have been injured may represent those members in a
judicial proceeding, 59 it is mandatory that the organization, despite its expertise in or longstanding concern with the subject
matter in controversy, have more than a mere interest in the
problem in order to render it "adversely affected" or "aggrieved"
under the APA. 60 Thus, although an environmental group is free
to represent its members, it must still allege an injury in fact.
Sierra Club reiterated the Data Processing principle that pro54 397 U.S. at 154.
55

See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970) (the public interest in environmental resources is
a legally protected interest affording environmental groups standing to obtain judicial
review of agency action); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (the consumer's interest in environmental protection may properly be
represented by a membership association with an organizational interest in the problem).
56405 U.S. 727 (1972); see Recent Decisions, Allegations of Direct Injury Are Required to Establish Standing in Accordance with the Administrative ProcedureAct, 43 U.
Miss. L.J. 538 (1972).
57 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
58 The court said that the Club had not alleged that they would be affected other than by
the actions being personally displeasing or distasteful to them. 433 F.2d at 33.
59 405 U.S. at 739. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
60405 U.S. at 739. The Court's opinion cites to various courts that have conferred
standing on organizations demonstrating an "organizational interest in the problem" of
environmental or consumer protection, Id. at 738- 39 & n. 14. The Court noted, however,
that in "most if not all" of the cases, there was a proper assertion of individualized injury
to either one party or to the members of an organization. See also id. at 760 n.l
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The Sierra Club v. Morton decision has led to increased interest in several bills which
would provide for citizen's suits and class actions under N EPA. See H.R. 59 1, 93d Cong,
1st Sess. (1973), H.R. 5074, H.R. 8331, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971). Cf. MICH. COMe.
LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1972), which gives any individual or organization
standing in environmental suits.
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tected interests could reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values; 6 1 but the opinion made clear that simply alleging
harm to such values was insufficient to confer standing and that to
gain standing "the party seeking review must have himself
62
suffered an injury."
Despite the immediate adverse effects of the Sierra Club decision on those seeking to preserve the wilderness area involved,
the case does not appear to have seriously impeded the ease with
which environmental groups may gain access to the courts. 6 3 The
premise that such a group can represent its members is firmly
established, as is the concept that environmental concerns may be
legally protected interests. The Sierra Club case seems only to
have reaffirmed the requirement that the group seeking standing
must allege that it or at least one of its members actually be
64
threatened with harm.
The heavy burden which enforcement of NEPA has placed on
the judiciary results not only from the ease with which plaintiffs
may gain standing to sue for such enforcement but also from the
broad nature of the review of an agency decision in which the
courts will engage. For example, even where the APA indicates
that an agency finding may not be reversed unless arbitrary or
capricious,6 the Supreme Court has held that the court may
inquire as to whether the agency decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear error
of judgment. 66 Indeed, although "[t]he court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency,' 6 7 there must nev68
ertheless be a probing review of the facts.
61 405 U.S. at 738.
62
Id.
6 The Court said that the decision in Sierra Club did not bar the Club from amending its
complaint in the district court. Id. at 736. The Sierra Club has since done so. 4 E.R.C.
1561 (N.D Cal. 1972).

64 Although in the context of the instant case the requirement may merely present an
easily surmountable procedural obstacle, a potential problem remains: who would be
entitled to sue when agency action threatens environmental values enjoyed by the public
as a whole? For an argument that Sierra Club does not foreclose recognizing the right of
any responsible citizen or citizens' group to gain standing in such cases, see CEQ THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 25 1. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sierra Club argued
for an "imaginative expansion" of traditional standing concepts to enable organizations
with "provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status" to litigate environmental issues.
405 U.S. at 757-58.
65
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
66
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
67 Id. at 416.
68 Id. In addition to the broad standard of review enunciated by the Supreme Court,
there has been a suggestion that the doctrine holding that environmental decisions by
administrative agencies are required to be sustained unless arbitrary or capircious be
abolished or substantially eased. REPORT OF THE LEGAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (December, 1972). See Joint Hearings on the Operation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Before the
Comm. on Public Works and the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United

States Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 467 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings].
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JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF

N EPA's

REQUIREMENTS

The great volume of litigation challenging agency actions for
failure to meet NEPA's requirements, encouraged by the liberalization of standing rules in combination with the probing review
engaged in by the courts, has resulted in considerable judicial
elaboration on the meaning of NEPA. Most of this judicial review
has been undertaken with the policies and goals of the Act in
mind, and the courts have clearly indicated that they will construe
the statutory language so as to give as full effect as possible to the
mandates of the Act. 69 The primary requirement which NEPA
imposes on the agencies is that they file an impact statement for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."- 70 The litigation under NEPA has been to

determine under what circumstances an impact statement must be
prepared, what information must be contained in such statements,
and how detailed that information must be.
Some courts have treated the "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" clause
as a unitary test, not separating the language "major Federal
actions" from the language "significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment. ' 71 The implicit assumption behind such

treatment must be that satisfaction of one criterion automatically
carries with it satisfaction of the second. Other courts, meanwhile,
have rejected the argument that merely because a federal action is
major, it will necessarily have a significant effect on the environment. In Hanly v. Mitchell,72 the court said that the terms were
separable, and that "major federal action" refers to such criteria
as the cost of the project, the amount of planning that preceded it,
69 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), in which Judge Wright said, "[O]ur duty ... is to see that important legislative
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways
of the federal bureaucracy." See also Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 Saved from "Crabbed Interpretation," 52 B.U.L. REV. 425 (1972).
7042 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). See Guidelines, supra note 20, at §§ 5(a), (b), (c);
notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra. For decisions examining the meaning of the
word "federal," see, e.g., City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 1972); Ely
v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971); Davis v. Morton, 335 F. Supp. 1258, 1260
(D.N.M. 1971); Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n. v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132, 144 (N.D.
Ga. 1971). For decisions construing the term "action," see, e.g., Port of New York
Authority v. United States, 451 F.2d 783, 788-90 (2d Cir. 1971); Named Individual
Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y. v. Texas Highway Dep't., 446 F.2d
1013, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1971).
71 See Citizens For Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789-90 (D. Me. 1972),
in which the court, resting primarily on the Navy's showing of nonsignificant environmental effect, concluded that a mock amphibious landing of 900 marines by vehicles and/or
helicoptors was not a major federal action significantly affecting the environment.
72460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
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and the time required to complete it. 7 3 The court in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Grant74 followed a similar approach. It construed "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" to refer to a project that had "an important
or meaningful effect, direct or indirect, upon a broad range of
aspects of the human environment," indicating that "the cumula75
tive impact with other projects must be considered."
The informational requirements of NEPA have caused one
76
court to refer to the Act as an environmental full disclosure law;
and in determining what information must be contained in the
impact statements, one theme running through many of the opinions is that the impact statement must put a complete record
before the agency so that the final decision will be a knowledgeable one. 7 7 Thus, more than mere mechanical adherence to
the statutory informational requirements is necessary. For example, some courts have held that in discussing the environmental
impact of a proposed action, the agency must discuss opposing
views of the action's potential effects. This requirement has been
phrased in terms of a duty to discuss "the full range of responsible
opinion," 78s even where the agency finds no merit whatsoever in
79
such opposing opinion.
In addition to the requirement that the impact statement discuss environmental consequences, there is a duty placed on the
73 Id. at 644.
74 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
75 Id. at 367.
76 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D.
Ark. 197 1) (an impact statement must discuss all known "possible" environmental consequences of proposed agency action). But see Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 933 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (an impact statement must discuss
the "significant" aspects of the "probable" environmental impact of proposed agency
action); Guidelines, supra note 20, § 6(a)(ii) (the "probable" impact of proposed action
must be discussed).
77 See, e.g., Committee For Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1971). In Joint Hearings, supra note 68, at 21, Dr. Russell Train, Chairman of the CEQ
said that "[T]hese decisions make clear that NEPA only requires what should already be
implicit in the notion of responsible decision making."
"8 Committee For Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
79 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D.
Ark. 197 1).
A question of institutional bias arises both in this context and also as to the degree of
objectivity required of an impact statement. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 4 E.R.C. 1721, 1724 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that impact statement for Gillham
Dam project adequately satisfied NEPA), the court said that the test of compliance with
NEPA was "one of good faith objectivity rather than subjective impartiality." See, e.g.,
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 197 1); Sierra Club
v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps
of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Conservation Council of North
Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
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agency to include discussion of alternatives to the proposed action.8 0 At least one court has interpreted this requirement to mean
that not only must the agency include all possible approaches to a
project, including total abandonment, 8 ' but it must also include
alternatives that are outside of the agency's cognizance or not
within its authority to implement. Thus, in Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Morton,82 the Department of Interior was
required to discuss the elimination of oil import quotas in its
impact statement on a proposed sale of oil and gas leases on the
Outer Continental Shelf. The broadness of the energy problem
which the sale of leases sought to alleviate required that all
alternatives be gathered for consideration by the ultimate decision-maker. 83 It has been emphasized, though, that these require84
ments are subject to a rule of reason.
Once a decision has been made that the scope of an impact
statement is adequate, the question remains as to whether the
statement is sufficiently "detailed." 85 The cases generally require
that the impact statement be in such adequate detail as to enable
the decision-maker to make a proper decision. The standard of
stringency applied by the courts, however, has varied. The court
in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,86 although
requiring that an impact statement be "marked by abundant detail" and supply "explicit findings," 8 7 found that since the impact
statement in question, when perused in its entirety, enabled the
reader "to gain a true perspective of what is bad as well as what is
good in terms of the environmental consequences ... ,88 it thus
served the intended purpose of the statement requirement.
In addition to detail, the court in Environmental Defense Fund
8042 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1970). See Guidelines, supra note 20, § 6(a)(iv).
8I

See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

82458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

8 Id. at 835. The court pointed out that since the impact statement goes to the Congress
and to the President, who have the authority to implement alternatives outside of a
particular agency's authority, the impact statement should include the alternatives so that
they may be considered by these higher authorities.
8458 F.2d at 836.
8 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
86348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972). The plaintiffs sought to restrain the Corps of
Engineers from initiating or continuing with the Tennessee-Tombigbee navigation project.
Id. at 932.
881d. at 940. See, e.g., Wilderness Society v. Morton, 4 E.R.C. 1467 (D.D.C.
87

1972)
(impact statement "reasonably" meets all of the requirements of the Act). The court in
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 12 11, 1217 (E.D. Ark.
1972) said that the courts must construe NEPA reasonably and thus
lilt is not necessary to dot all the I'sand cross all the T's in an impact
statement.
...It is doubtful that any agency, however objective, however sincere,
however well-staffed, and however well-financed could come up with a
perfect environmental impact statement in connection with any major project.
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v. Hardin,89 required that the statement include the results of an
adequate research program, undertaken as part of the systematic,
interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems mandated
by NEPA, and that the results of this research be accompanied by
adequate documentation9 0 A searching examination into the
sufficiency of the TVA's impact statement in Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA 91 forced the court to conclude that although
the draft impact statement 9 2 filed was "comprehensive in
scope," 93 the cost-benefit analysis in the statement "consist[ed]
almost entirely of unsupported conclusions," and the thoroughness and merit of the research upon which the conclusions were
94
based were indeterminable.
If an impact statement is to serve not only as a guide to the
initial decision-maker, but also as an effective basis for review by
subsequent decision- makers, the stringency of these requirements
of detail and documentation must be maintained? 5 Unsubstantiated decisions merely present obstacles to informed decision-making. An informed decision, produced as a result of a
proper balancing of factors, can more easily be reviewed by
others and will insure that "presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations .. ".."96
The courts have therefore stringently applied the procedural
requirements embodied in Section 102. Up to this point in time,
however, the courts have generally interpreted their role of review
under NEPA as being limited merely to assuring federal agency
compliance with Section 102.9 7 It seems that an agency's final
decision will not be reversed on the merits for failure to give
89325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971). An injunction was sought to prevent the Secretary
of Agriculture from undertaking a cooperative federal-state program to control the imported fire ant in the southeastern United States.
90
1d. at 1403.
91 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
92 The final statement was in preparation at the time of trial.
93 339 F. Supp. at 809. However, the court noted that the draft statement had not dealt
with some objections to the proposed action.
94 Id. at 809.
95See also Note, Evolving Judicial Standards Under the National Environmental
Policy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592, 1600-01 (1972),
deciding that of three general categories of data which could be required in impact
statements ("description," "quantification," and "monetization") "quantification" is the
required type of data sufficiency. The cases, taken together with the procedural requirements of NEPA, suggest that all three types may be required and that a justiciable
standard may only be obtainable on a case by case basis.
96 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970).
97See, e.g., Committee For Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1971).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 6:49 1

adequate weight to the environmental effects of the proposal in
question. 98
Two courts have argued that decisions on the merits which
arbitrarily or capriciously deal with environmental concerns
would be reversed.9 9 This approach, however, does not appear to
be grounded in the language of NEPA but rather in the language
of Section 706(2)(A) of the APA. 10 0 Thus, the real issue is whether or not NEPA allows courts to review decisions which fall short
of violating the APA's standards of arbitrariness and capriciousness. To this date no court has held that NEPA so extends the
court's review powers.
IV.

THE ARGUMENT FOR SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW

If the courts were to give substantive effect to NEPA's policies, agency decision-making would be reviewed in accordance
with the congressional declaration of national environmental policy set forth in Section 101 of the Act. Because the courts, in
reviewing cases arising under NEPA, have generally determined
only whether the agency has compiled an adequate environmental
impact statement as required by Section 102, rather than whether
the agency has given adequate weight to the information contained in the statement, NEPA's policies have not yet been directly
implemented by judicial action. Such judicial action has been the
objective of many of the suits filed under NEPA. Suits brought by
the various environmental associations were filed not merely to
insure that federal agencies comply with paperwork requirements,
but rather to contest the merits of an agency's decision that a
given project was justified in spite of the severe ecological injuries
98

See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
99See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
197 1); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 4 E.R.C. 1721, 1728 (8th Cir.
1972).
In the latter case the court actually reviewed a substantive agency decision on its merits.
The court of appeals found that the decision of the Corps of Engineers to complete the
Gillham Dam project was not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 1728. In arriving at this
holding, the court compared the benefits of flood control with the importance of a diversified environment. Id.
1005 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970) prescribing that the reviewing court shall hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
The court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 4 E.R.C. 1721 (8th
Cir. 1972), clearly adopted this standard of review:
The reviewing court must first determine whether the agency acted within the
scope of its authority, and next whether the decision reached was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
Id. at 1728.
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it might cause. Nevertheless, the courts generally refuse to examine the agency's decision on the merits. 10 1
As a result, the suits centering on NEPA have merely placed
additional administrative burdens on the federal agencies, 10 2 but
generally have not affected the actual decisions made by these
agencies.' 0 3 The nature of the remedies granted in suits against
agencies for failure to comply with NEPA dramatically emphasizes this point. Plaintiffs in these suits typically have sought
injunctive remedies. The courts, when finding noncompliance with
NEPA, have usually responded by granting preliminary injunctions.1 0 4 These injunctions are removed, 0 5 however, once the
101See notes 97- 100 and accompanying text supra. But see Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 4 E.R.C. 1721 (8th Cir. 1972).
102See, e.g., Cramton & Berg, Enforcing the National Environmental Policy Act in
Federal Agencies, 18 PRAC. LAW., May, 1972, at 86: "[Flederal agencies appear to be
encountering severe difficulties in complying with NEPA as construed by reviewing
courts."
103There are few instances where federal projects have been modified or abandoned
when their adverse environmental effects were found to be unacceptable. See, e.g., CEQ
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 226-27. The CEQ has listed five accomplishments of NEPA: (1) national policies have been brought into line with modern
concerns for the quality of life; (2) a systematic way of dealing with complex problems
involving several agencies has been provided and more sophisticated decision-making has
been fostered; (3) a broad range of federal government activities has been opened to public
scrutiny; (4) agency staffs have been supplemented with personnel trained in environmental disciplines and their focus of concerns has been broadened; (5) suits by citizens have
enforced the requirements of the Act and agencies have been forced to take their tasks
seriously. CEQ THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 255-56. However, these
"accomplishments" deal only with the beneficial effect NEPA has had in orienting the
administrative process to environmental matters, as opposed to any beneficial effects on
the environment itself by virtue of the agencies' giving weight to environmental values in
their
decision-making. Cf. Cramton and Berg, supra note 102, at 83-86.
10
4See, e.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (failure to file statement);
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972) (pending approval of
impact statement by Secretary of Transportation); Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972) (failure to prepare
statement); Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F.. Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis.
1972) (failure to file statement); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167
(S.D. Iowa 1972) (failure to consider project in its entirety); Boston Waterfront Residents
Ass'n v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972) (failure to file statement); Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972) (failure
to file statement); Silva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972) (failure to file
statement); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1972) (failure to prepare statement). For earlier cases, see Note, supra note 95, at 1596 n.
23.
In determining whether or not to grant an injunction the courts, following a traditional
approach, have required that the plaintiff show irreparable harm, and probable success on
the merits; there must be no adequate remedy at law; and the injuries to the parties must
be balanced. The courts usually have required that the plaintiffs merely post bonds of
nominal value to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c).
See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232
(4th Cir. 1971) ($100.00); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 331 F.
Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1971) ($1.00). Bat see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant,
341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972) ($75,000).
"°See,e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D. Ark. 1972).
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agency has complied with the terms of Section 102. That is to say,
the courts will enjoin a federal project only so long as (1)an
impact statement is required and has not been filed, or (2) an
impact statement, if filed, does not comply with the standards
10 6
previously discussed.
If federal agencies are being forced to compile thorough impact
statements, they should also be forced to consider the information
in these statements while arriving at a final decision. There are
two possible means of assuring this result: (1) the courts can
construe Section 101 of NEPA to give federal agencies substantive duties to take into account environmental factors in the final
decision on whether to undertake a federal project; or (2) the
Congress can pass legislation strengthening NEPA by providing
for substantive judicial review.
The first approach-a revised judicial construction of
NEPA-can be accomplished by treating the policies and goals in
Section 101 as legal duties which federal agencies must fulfill. If
such an approach is followed, and if a federal agency fails to adopt
the policies and goals of Section 101 in a decision, environmental
groups could seek judicial review under the APA alleging that the
federal agency's acts were not "in accordance with law."

10 7

There are several provisions in NEPA which could be used to
argue that Section 101 imposes legal duties on federal agencies.
Section 102 directs that "to the fullest extent possible (1) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set
forth in this [Act] ...."8 Certainly the policies outlined in Section 101 are covered in this directive. One could point to the goals
listed in Subsection 10 1(b)10 9 and argue that these goals are incorporated expressly in the "policies, regulations, and public laws
of the United States." Under such a construction, for example,
federal agencies would have the legal duty to "preserve important
historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage .. .

Section 103111 can also be used to substantiate this view. Under this section all federal agencies were directed to review their
current practices and policies to see if they deviated from the
1

06 See notes 34-40 and 76-94 and accompanying text supra.
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
10842 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1970).
109 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
11042 U.S.C. § 433 I(b)(4) (1970). See also Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of
the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C.
1075

IND. & COM. L. REV. 685 (1972).
111 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970).
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policies outlined in NEPA. If there were any such deviations, the
agencies were to propose to the President "such measures as may
be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity
with the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this
[Act]." 112 The courts have thus far rigidly forced federal agencies
to adopt the procedures of NEPA.' 1 3 When the words intent and
purposes are included in the same phrase as procedures in a
conjunctive manner, it seems unreasonable to force agencies to
adhere to NEPA's procedures but not to its intent or purposes.
One can also point to the overall scheme of NEPA to argue
that Section 101 imposes legal duties on federal agencies. Under
Section 102 federal agencies are required to compile exhaustive
studies on potential environmental effects. 1 14 The agencies, after
compiling such statements, have readily accessible data which can
serve as valuable input to the final decision-making process. Furthermore, the impact statement also facilitates any potential court
review of an agency's decision."15 In this light it makes little sense
to force agencies to engage in expensive studies 1 16 and then not to
force them to use these studies while making a final decision.
Finally, the purposes of N EPA, as outlined in Section 2 of the
Act, 117 seem to indicate that Section 101 should have substantive
meaning. One of the purposes of the Act is "to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man ....",H It
is hard to see how mere compliance with the procedural requirements of Section 102 will effectuate this purpose. Merely forcing
federal agencies to disclose the environmental effects of their acts
could have little or no effect on the agencies' efforts to prevent
ecological damage. Forcing federal agencies to effectuate certain
environmental goals would, however, promote efforts to minimize
environmental problems.
There are at least three countervailing arguments to a court's
construing the statute so as to provide substantive judicial review
under NEPA. First, Section 105 explicitly states that the "pol12

1 1d. (emphasis added).
113
See notes 68-96 and accompanying text supra.
114
See notes 76-96 and accompanying text supra.
'I 5 See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
116
The CEQ has estimated that the costs of studying environmental effects may run as
high as $65 million a year when NEPA is fully underway. CEQ THIRD ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 26. at 258.
11742 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). (The Environmental Protection Agency has said that the
objective of NEPA is "to build into the agency decision-making process an appropriate
and careful consideration of all environmental aspects of proposed actions." Interim
Environmental Protection Agency Regulations on Preparation of Environmental Impact

Statements, at § 6.10(a). 3 ENv. RPTR. 1136 (Jan. 19, 1973) .
18
1 Id. § 4321.
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icies and goals set forth in this [Act] are supplementary to those
set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies." 11 9 Thus
the argument would be that, because NEPA's policies are supplemental to the policies of the agencies' organic acts, the agencies
are not required to consider NEPA's policies if, in their judgment,
those policies interfere with their primary duties. However, even
if the word supplementary is construed to mean subordinate or
peripheral to the policies and goals of each agency, this construction does not preclude requiring substantive consideration of
NEPA's policies in the agency's decision-making process. Rather,
it only speaks to the weight such values are to be given in agency
deliberation. Only if supplementary is construed in the very narrow sense of meaning "exclusive," i.e., that the values in NEPA
are not to be given any weight until the agency judges its own
values to be fully satisfied, can it be said that the terms of the Act
prohibit courts from enforcing substantive consideration of
NEPA's policies. Moreover, although Section 105 states that the
policies and goals of NEPA are to be supplementary to the
existing authorizations of federal agencies, it does not state that
the procedures of NEPA are supplementary. Because the procedural requirements of NEPA are phrased in terms of legal duties
and apparently are not supplementary to other agency duties, one
could argue that Section 105 therefore indicates that the policies
1 20
and goals of NEPA are not to be treated as legal duties.
Nevertheless, the fact that NEPA's policies are said to be supplementary to, and not exclusive of, the existing authorizations of
federal agencies could indicate that Congress did intend that federal agencies were to account for the policies in Section 101.
Second, the language of Section 101 enumerating findings of
policy is not nearly as directed and forceful as the language of the
procedural requirements in Section 102.121 Since Section 102 was
meant to impose legal duties upon agencies, 1 2 2 this dichotomy
could be used to imply that Congress meant that Section 101 was
not to impose mandatory obligations on federal agencies.
Finally, the legislative history of the Act apparently indicates
119 Id. § 4335 (emphasis added).

120 The legislative history of NEPA, however, indicates that Section 105 requires the
agencies to "conduct their activities in accordance with [NEPA] unless to do so would
violate their existing statutory authorizations." 115 CONG. REC. 40418 (1969). Thus
Section 105 does not excuse agency compliance with NEPA except in limited circumstances. Section 103 seems to support this view. See text accompanying notes II1-13
supra.
121 For example, Section 101 states that all "practicable" means should be used so that
the nation "may" achieve certain goals, while Section 102 states that the agencies "shall"
comply with certain procedures "to the fullest extent possible."
122 See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969) (Conference Report).
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that Section 101 has no substantive impact.1 2 3 Illustratively, one
can point to the Senate amendments to Subsection 101(c). The
language comprising Subsection 101(c) before it was amended
read in part, "The Congress recognizes that each person has a
fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment .... ,"124 Subsection 101(c) now reads, "The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment ...... ,,125 It can be argued that this change indicates that
Section 101 was not intended by the Senate to give individuals
legal rights against federal agencies for the violation of the duties
26
listed in Subsection 101(b).1
If the courts continue to be unwilling to deal with these problems and if they continue to hold that NEPA does not have a
substantive impact on the decision-making process, then Congress
should rectify the matter by legislative command. To refuse to
modify NEPA by legislative action would be to preserve a system
which dramatically increases a federal agency's workload but
which has little or no substantive impact on the manner in which
the agency treats environmental concerns.
V.

CONCLUSION

A combination of factors-liberalized standing rules, broad
scope of judicial review, and apparent judicial commitment to the
underlying policies of NEPA- works to give independent assurance that federal agencies have before them thorough information
on the effects which their projects are likely to have on the
environment. It seems, however, that the expenditure of so much
time and effort should result in something more than mere assurance that environmental effects will be known to the agencies.
Until environmental effects must actually be taken into account as
a factor to be given weight in agency decision-making, rather than
merely described and acknowledged, the ultimate goals of NEPA
will remain unachieved.
The present apparatus of judicial review under NEPA and the
123 See,

Id.

124 Id,
12542 U.S.C. § 433 1(c) (1970).
126 See note 13 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Senator Jackson, in
discussing this change said,
I opposed this change in conference committee because it is my belief that
the language of the Senate passed bill reaffirmed what is already the law of
this land.... If this is not the law of this land ... it is my view that some
fundamental changes are in order.

115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969) (Conference Report).
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APA is well designed to work as an independent check on agency
actions. The impact statement required by NEPA is a sound
vehicle by which to provide a thorough record for judicial review,
so that the courts may more easily determine what factors the
agency must have considered in making its decision. What is
needed to make this check truly effective is a mandate for the
courts to enforce environmental values on the agencies so that
action that fails to give sufficient weight to public values of conservation, recreation, natural beauty, and the like can actually be
stopped rather than merely being publicized.
-Lloyd A. Fox

